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VALIDATION OF POLITICAL SIMULATION MODELS 
-WATER RESOURCE PROJECTS’ 
Jonathan W. Bulkley and Julie Antill’ 
ABSTRACT. The critical role of political processes in water resource projects has recently been 
placed in a new perspective [Hall, 19701. The “political hassle” period of institutional interaction 
which serves to resolve political conflicts over such aspects as organizational growth and survival, 
responsibility for economic liabilities, and responsibility for economic benefits, requires systematic 
analysis in order to improve our capability to implement water projects. Failure to properly assess 
the political aspects of a proposed water project may result in extensive delays with significant 
economic losses. The complexities associated with water use and re-use have created the need for 
new institutional arrangements which can more effectively function to implement policies and 
programs. 
One tool which has recently become available for the research investigator concerned with insti- 
tutional interactions and political processes associated with water resource projects is the technique 
of computer simulation of such institutional interaction. In theory, this new approach will enable 
the investigator to assess the political feasibility or political acceptability of a proposed water project 
given existing institutional structures. Furthermore, the investigator has the opportunity to experi- 
ment with new and innovative institutional arrangements which may in turn enhance the political 
acceptability of a proposed project. 
The specific material presented within this paper reports upon the validation of an existing 
computer simulation model designed to replicate political interactions in resource allocation p rob  
lems-including water resource problems. This validation effort is done by taking an actual water 
problem and comparing what the political simulation models predicts in terms of political outcomes 
with what actually takes place. The case study in question is the formulation and legislative develop- 
ment of the Michigan Bond lssue for Water Pollution Control. 
(KEY WORDS: political models; simulation models; computer models; political science; Michigan; 
water pollution control) 
POLITICAL SYSTEMS 
In abstract terms, a political system is that collection of elements which interact to allocate 
scarce resources among competing and possibly conflicting uses. Clearly, if a society had 
access to unlimited resources, there would be little need for political systems to exist in such a 
society. All human needs and demands for resource allocation would be satisfied from the 
unlimited resource pool. In reality, demands exceed available resources; therefore, political 
systems exist to provide choice-making procedures for the allocatio? of scarce resources 
among competing potential uses. Water resource projects are particularly good examples of 
decision-making processes which contain significant political components. While the hydro- 
logic cycle acts to replenish and circulate water within the environment, the distribution of 
water in the environment is not uniform. In fact, differential demand situations exist such 
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that certain geographical areas with limited quantities of natural water may be regions of high 
water demand. Consequently, differential demand conditions coupled with anticipated future 
increases in demand for water in plentiful quantities and acceptable quality act to create con- 
ditions which require a political system for choice-making regarding water projects. 
Major water resource projects may be characterized by what has been termed “a political 
hassle period” [Hall, 19701. The duration of this period has been observed to range from five 
to thirty years. The political hassle represents that period of time required to resolve political 
conflicts associated with the proposed water project. In terms of the abstract definition of 
political system, the “political hassle” period represents the time required for the political 
system to interact and resolve the problem of resource allocation among competing and con- 
flicting uses. The importance of the political component of water resource projects is clearly 
seen if one accepts the observation that the average minimum time required between percep- 
tion of need and provision of first service is ten years [Hall, 19701. One expects the political 
hassle period to account for 30% to 50% of the time lapse between need-perception and first 
service. Consequently, it is of importance to examine the processes which take place during 
the period of political interaction regarding water projects. Such analysis may lead to more 
efficient and effective political instruments to reduce the associated time lapse between need- 
perception and first-service. 
One research technique which is suitable for analysis of the political interaction associated 
with water projects is to “model” the political interaction process. The investigator must 
specify a set of rules which are an attempt to specify the basic processes which the appropriate 
political system performs during conflict resolution and resource allocation [Maass et al., 
19621. Provided that the investigator has specified the interaction to flow from an initial 
condition to a terminal point, it is feasible to translate the “model” from verbal to an opera- 
tional computer simulation model [Males et a/., 1970; Bulkley and McLaughlin, 19663 . 
POLITICAL MODEL: BASIC CHARACTERISTICS 
The political model used in this analysis is composed of six basic elements. These elements 
constitute a logical model of the political interaction process associated with resource alloca- 
tion problems. The model is a descriptive model as opposed to a normative model. In essence 
it is an effort to describe the world of political interaction as it is in contrast to how it should 
be. The political model is designed to interface with a normative model-especially a linear 
programming analysis of the resource allocation project under investigation. To date, this 
interface has not been tested. The basic political theory reflected in the model is that conflict 
(within bounds) is a useful and actually imperative component of the political process. 
Conflict assumes that proposed problem solutions are responsive to the needs of the public 
being affected by the resource allocation project. 
The political simulation model is issue oriented. Each of the following elements of the 
model utilizes data collected by the researcher in the context of a specific issue or resource 
allocation problem. Associated with each issue will be two or more alternatives which are 
perceived outcomes or results which would resolve the issue under investigation. The alterna- 
tives may or may not be mutually exclusive. The output from the political simulation model 
in this validation study is a prediction of the political feasibility or political acceptance of 
what actually was chosen to resolve the issue in question. Since political models clearly do not 
describe physical processes which proceed from basic natural laws or first principles, the 
model cannot be expected to produce a deterministic result. Rather, the simulated results are 
indicators of expected trends. Given the presence of certain random components within the 
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model, a distribution of outcomes is obtained. Significance is attached to the 80% or greater 
level in predicted outcomes. If the model indicates that the coalitions favoring the proposed 
allocation “dominate” in 80% or more of the simulated political interactions, one would 
interpret these results to indicate that the proposed alternative has a high degree of political 
acceptance or it is politically feasible. On the other hand if the predicted distribution of 
dominant coalitions ‘indicates that the concurring coalitions dominate in less than 80% of the 
simulated encounters, two interpretations may b: attached to the results. First, if the concur- 
ring coalitions dominate in less than 80% but more than 2% of the simulated political 
interactions, the political outcome is not clear. More negotiation/bargaining is required among 
the decision units in order to develop additional alternatives or convince certain of the 
decision units to alter their priorities. If the concurring coalitions dominate in less than 200/0 
of the simulated encounters, the proposed alternative is not politically feasible. 
POLITICAL MODEL: ELEMENTS 
The six elements which are used to develop this predictive capability are as follows: 
(1) Position Matrix: Each of the decision units which can be identified as interacting to 
influence the decision regarding the specific issue being investigated must have its positions 
(favorable, ambivalent, opposed) upon the specific issue alternatives reflected in the Position 
Matrix. This matrix relates decision units with available alternatives and the elements of the 
matrix represent orientation of the decision unit to each of the available alternatives. 
( 2 )  Political Power Coefficient: Each of the decision units has associated with it, a coeffi- 
cient calculated from data collected by the researcher. This coefficient represents the relative 
capacity for the particular decision unit to influence the final decision in the specific issue 
under investigation. This coefficient is not a zero-sum coefficient; however, the summation of 
all coefficients is equal to one and is assumed to represent the total political power which can 
be brought to bear upon resolving the issue at the time of simulation. 
(3) Conflict Identification: Procedures are incorporated into the model which identify 
presence or absence of conflict between decision units as a function of the elements of the 
Position Matrix and as a function of the alternative each decision unit favors for the simula- 
tion being performed. This process includes a random component to decide whether or not 
conflict is present under certain conditions. Coalition formation is a function of the presence 
or absence of conflict between decision units. 
(4) Political Interaction: Each decision unit responds to the proposed solution (alternative) 
by comparing its individual desires for solving the issue with the proposed solution. Three 
responses are possible: concurrence (support), opposition, or ambivalence. In the latter case, a 
random number is utilized to assign ambivalent decision units to either the concurrence or 
opposition categories. 
(5) Coalition Formation: Once the entire population of decision units has been polarized 
into either support or opposition categories, the process of coalition formation takes place. 
First, coalition leaders for both the concurring group and the opposing group are selected. 
Coalition formation takes place when both the coalition leader and potential coalition 
member are not in conflict with one another-as determined in (3) above. If coalition forma- 
tion takes place, the political power coefficients of coalition members are added together. The 
coalition-either concurring or opposing-which amasses the largest aggregate of political 
power wins (dominates) the particular simulated encounter. Dominant coalitions are recorded. 
(6) Generation of Proposed Reallocation: In certain situations, it is relevant to consider a 
revised solution based upon the political desires of the members of dominant opposition 
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coalitions. The model has the capability to generate such a revised solution and test it  €or 
political feasibility. Clearly such a proposal would have to be tested for physical/economic 
feasibility as well. 
MODEL VALIDATION 
The critical step following model formulation and computer development is to validate the 
model. Model validation is accomplished by comparing the simulated results of political 
interaction obtained from the computer model with actual political results or outcomes in a 
specific water resource problem. This paper reports upon a validation effort performed upon a 
specific computer model designed to simulate political interactions associated with water 
resource projects. The case chosen for model validation is the formulation and implementation 
of the 1968 Michigan Bond Program for Water Pollution Control. This major water resource 
program involves the issuance by the State of Michigan of bonds totalling $335 million for 
water pollution control within the State. The plan for the bond project was announced by the 
Governor of Michigan in early January 1968. The voters approved the proposed bond program 
in November, 1968; and the enabling legislation was enacted in June, 1969. 
Five basic political issues associated with the formulation and enabling legislation stages of 
the 1968 Michigan Program for Water Pollution Control were chosen for model validation. 
The results simulated by the political model for these five political issues are compared with 
the actual political outcomes. These comparisons form the basis for observations regarding the 
validity and usefulness of the political simulation model. Table 1 and Table 2 list the five 
political issues examined for model validation. Table 1 specifies two issues which were distinct 
both in content and in time period. Table 2 identifies one issue which recurred at three dis- 
tinct time periods during the formulation and legislative stages of the Pollution Control 
Program. Associated with each issue shown in Table 1 and Table 2 are the realistic alternatives 
which were perceived to be viable solutions to the specific political issue under examination. 
TABLE 1 
Political Issues: Michigan Bond Program-Water Pollution Control 
First Issue: Source of Funds for State contribution to  water pollution abatement program 
Alternatives: 
(a) Legislative appropriation each year from the general fund 
(b) State borrows funds by selling bonds 
(c) State assumes total cost of construction and maintenance of sewage treatment works 
(use fees and selling bonds) 
Second Issue: Should an additional $50 million be provided and earmarked for the construction of 
collecting sewers in smaller, rural communities 
Al tema tives: 
(a) To provide $285 million for treatment works and $50 million for collecting sewers 
(b)To provide only $285 million for treatment works 
(rural areas) 





Political Issues: Michigan Bond Program-Water Pollution Control 
Which unit will determine the allocation of State funds to municipalities 
(Program Formulation Stage) 
Alternatives: 
(a) Water Resources Commission (WRC) 
(b) State Legislature 
Which unit will determine the allocation of State funds to municipalities 
(Early Legislation Period) 
Alternatives: 
(a) Water Resources Commission (WRC) 
(b) State Legislature 
Which unit will determine the allocation of State funds to municipalities 
(Late Legislation Period) 
Alternatives: 
(a) Water Resources Commission (WRC) 
(b) State Legislature 
(c) Compromise Solution 
POLITICAL SIMULATION 
Issue One: Source of Funds for the Program 
In the formulation stage (prior to voter approval) there were four primary decision units 
interacting to decide upon the method of funding for the State’s contribution to the water 
pollution control program. These four decision units were the following; 
The Governor (Governor Romney) 
The Water Resources Commission 
The Bureau of the Budget 
Joint Legislative Committee on Water Resource Planning 
This latter group composed of Representatives and Senators had been established in 1965 to 
study methods of financing sewage treatment works. A report prepared by this committee 
documented several alternative means of financing sewage treatment facilities. Therefore, even 
though the actual Committee had completed its task prior to the formulation of the Michigan 
Program, the Committee is included as a decision unit on the basis of its substantive study and 
analysis of the problem of financing such activities. The three main methods which were con- 
sidered for financing the state-wide pollution control program were the following: 
1) Appropriation of funds each year by the State Legislature from the General Fund 
2) State borrows money by issuing bonds backed by the full faith and credit of the State 
3) State constructs and operates all new sewage treatment works (user fees and bonds 
As specified in the section of the political model, data was collected which reflected the actual 
positions of the decision units upon each of these alternatives. Also systematic efforts were 
undertaken to estimate the actual political power resources associated with each of the 
of Michigan 
would be required to finance this operation) 
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decision units. Realistic goals of each of the decision units regarding the alternatives were 
specified. Finally the model was run and a proposed solution was tested for political accept- 
ance. Table 3 lists the results of the simulation run. Each simulation run is composed of 100 
simulated political interactions. From Table 3, it is clear that no opposing coalition was able 
to dominate in any of these simulated interactions. With regard to the concurring coalitions- 
i.e., the response pattern of decision units which support the proposed solution-the concur- 
ring coalitions dominated in all of the 100 simulated political interactions. The number in 
parentheses following each decision unit is the number of times that the particular decision 
unit was a member of a dominant coalition. The random components which exist in the model 
particularly in conflict identification account for the fact that none of the decision units in 
this case was a member of every dominant coalition. The Joint Legislative Committee opposed 
the proposed solution but alone was not able to dominate against the coalition patterns 
generated by the other three decision units which favored the bond method for raising funds. 
The simulated results are significant as previously defined; one concludes that the bond 
proposal would be politically acceptable. In the actual case, the bonding method for funding 
was adopted. 
TABLE 3. Results of Simulated Political Interaction* 
Issue One: Source of Funds for State Contribution to Water Pollution abatement program 
Proposed Solution: State borrows funds by selling bonds 
First Simulation: Data representing actual situation 
Allocation Opposition (source of funds) - no dominant coalition 
Allocation Concurrence 
GOV OFFICE (59) WRC (44) 
JTLEGCOM (0) 
B BUDGET (50) 
lOO/O Split in favor of proposed solution 
1 OO/O Split in favor of selling bonds 
GOV OFFICE = Governor’s Office under the leadership of Governor George Romney unit Jan. 69, then 
under the leadership of Governor William Milliken 
JT LEG COM = Joint Legislative Committee 
WRC = Water Resources Commission 
B BUDGET = Bureau of the Budget 
*Example of the results obtained from the model; space requirement precluded display of the same type 
of information for the remaining issues. 
For the purpose of model testing, numerous additiond simulation runs were made with 
each issue. Regarding this Issue, one of these additional simulations was to switch the 
Governor’s position and goal to favoring alternative three. The purpose of this additional run 
was twofold: first, to test model sensitivity to changes in input data; and secondly, to examine 
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a hypothesis that in the early formulation stage, the support of the Governor was critical with 
regard to political acceptance of a particular alternative. The results obtained suggest that the 
Governor formed an effective coalition with the Joint Legislative Committee. Specifically, the 
probability of acceptance of the proposed solution (bonds) was reduced from 1.0 to .43. 
According to our criteria, this predicted result would indicate that the political feasibility of 
the proposed solution is questionable. This example is included to indicate the potential for 
utilization of the model to investigate “what if’ inquiries regarding likely behavior on the part 
of the participating decision units. 
Issue Two: Should an additional $50 million be provided 
and earmarked for the construction of collecting sewers 
in smaller, rural communities 
The technical staff of the Water Resources Commission examined the urban area require- 
ments for waste water treatment facilities through 1980. This analysis indicated that given 
anticipated Federal contributions through matching grants it would be necessary for the State 
to raise $285 million for the State’s portion of the program. During the program’s formulation 
stage, members of special investigating committees in the Legislature were made aware of the 
very real financial burden being placed upon small rural communities desiring to improve their 
capabilities t o  provide effective waste water treatment facilities. Consequently, these legisla- 
tors with the concurrence of other influential groups decided to propose that the Michigan 
Bond Program provide an additional $50 million for rural communities to build collecting 
sewers. In the actual situation the issue was resolved in favor of providing the additional 
funds since it clearly represented a positive-sum situation. The incremental funding would be 
added on to what had already been determined to be an adequate sum for the urban areas. 
The political model predicted a high degree of political support for the proposed alternative. 
Issue Three, Four, and Five: Which governmental unit will determine 
the allocation of State funds to municipalities 
The research. effort identified the above stated issue as having been initially considered 
during the Program Formulation Stage (Issue 3). It surfaced again during the Early Legislation 
Stage (Issue 4) as the State Legislature attempted to structure the enabling legislation to 
implement the Pollution Control Program. It  required a further appearance (Issue 5) in the 
Late Legislation Stage to actually resolve the question. 
This issue represents several important dimensions of the political aspects of water resource 
problems. First, it  should be clear that the Water Pollution Control Program for the State of 
Michigan is unique in the history of the State. The governmental unit responsible for allocat- 
ing the several hundreds of millions of dollars to municipalities may be expected to become a 
more powerful unit on a state-wide basis. Second, the analysis which sized the fiscal require- 
ments to “adequately” meet the state-wide needs for water pollution control facilities did not 
consider nutrient removal. Therefore, it is anticipated that the $285 million will be consider- 
ably less than is actually needed. As a result, the present limited dollar resources will be sought 
in a competitive fashion by the municipalities of the State. Third, the choice between the 
Water Resources Commission and the State Legislature as the responsible governmental unit to 
allocate the State funds reflects the differing perceptions of the method of solution of the 
water pollution problem. On the one hand, it may be argued that waste water treatment is a 
technical-engineering problem capable of solution by strictly rational analysis. This is the 
1078 Bulkley and Antill 
position of those decision units favoring the Water Resources Commission as the responsible 
unit for allocating Pollution Control program funds. In contrast, another argument states that 
the allocation of scarce fiscal resources to improve water pollution control is basically a 
political problem. The proponents of this position will cite the apparent inability of the 
technical experts to agree upon a single rational analysis of the waste water treatment problem 
in the State of Michigan. In the absence of rational analysis, political factors need to enter into 
the decision process. Consequently, the adherents of this latter philosophy conclude that the 
State Legislature should be the decision unit actually allocating funds to specific projects. This 
arrangement-in the view of its supporters-would allow for representation of the public 
interest in pollution abatement through the controlling action of the elected officials. 
The distinction between Issues Three, Four, and Five may be clearly drawn. Issue Three 
represented the problem of designating a responsible unit of government for funding alloca- 
tion during the problem formulation stage. The twenty participants in this process included 
thirteen decision units outside of the State Legislature. Issue Four represented the State 
Legislature’s initial attempt to resolve the issue and prepare the enabling legislation. In this 
case, fifteen decision units were identified as interacting to prepare the legislation. Of these 
fifteen participating units, ten or two-thirds came from within the Legislature itself. In addi- 
tion to the fact that different decision units were involved in issue resolution, problem 
perception is an important distinguishing characteristic. In the formulation stage (Issue Three) 
the issue may never have to be faced-i.e., the voters may reject the proposal. However, once 
the voters give overwhelming support to the program and authorize the State to proceed with 
program implementation, the issue perception changes. The State Legislature recognizes the 
existence of significant public interest in the problem of water pollution control. Consequent- 
ly, elements within the State Legislature are anxious to retain control of the actual imple- 
mentation of the program. Issue Five differs from Issue Four only in the fact that a compro- 
mise solution was prepared following the inability of the interacting groups to resolve the 
conflict in a politically feasible manner in Issue Five. 
Issue Three: Which governmental unit will determine the allocation 
of State funds to municipalities (Program Formulation Stage) 
In this case, the computer model predicted a high degree of political acceptance of the 
Water Resources Commission being designated the responsible governmental unit for fiscal 
allocation (Program Formulation Stage). In the actual situation the Water Resources Commis- 
sion was designated as the responsible unit for funding allocations with little opposition during 
the program formulation stage. 
Issue Four: Which goveqmental unit will determine the allocation 
of State funds to municipalities (Enabling Legislation Stage-Early) 
At this point, the legislature addressed itself to the problem of producing the enabling 
legislation. As previously noted, during the formulation stage, there had been very little 
opposition to the concept that the Water Resources Commission would be the responsible 
governmental unit for allocating the funds. However, during the preparation of the enabling 
legislation the legislature was initially unable to resolve this issue. Fifteen decision units3 were 
3 A  new committee (House-Senate Conference Committee) was created as a result of the impass in the 
legislature. Accordingly in this simulation, its presence is noted but its capacity for leadership is minimal. 
The simulation of Issue Five places this committee in its leadership role. 
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identified as interacting to influence the outcome of this issue. The political simulation model 
tested the political feasibility of the Water Resources Commission being designated as the unit 
having prime responsibility for the allocation of state funds. The simulated political accept- 
ability of the proposed course of action declined dramatically from the Issue Three situation. 
The predicted feasibility of the Water Resources Commission as the unit responsible for fund- 
ing allocations dropped from 96% dominance to 55%. Conversely, the opposing units have 
gained strength from 4% to 45% dominance. Simulated results are significant at the 80% level 
or greater. Accordingly, the 55/45 split obtained from the simulation model for this issue may 
be considered to represent the stalemate which actually developed within the legislature. 
In the simulation case, the leader of the concurring coalitions was the Governor’s office. 
Membership in this coalition included the House Republicans, House Conservation and 
Recreation Committee, the House Sponsors of the legislation, the Conference Committee, The 
Water Resources Commission, and the Bureau of the Budget. The opposition strength was 
based primarily in the Appropriations Committees in both the Senate and the House. Clearly, 
these two units would lose the greatest amount of legislative prerogative if the control of 
project funding passed from the Legislature. Additional support came from the Senate 
membership as a whole and the House Democrats who opposed the Governor on this issue. 
Issue Five: Which governmental unit will determine the allocation 
of State funds to municipalities (Legislation Stage-Late) 
Late in the enabling legislation stage, the basic problem of designating a responsible unit 
for fiscal allocation still had not been resolved. In short, the conflict resolution procedures 
had not been able to obtain a politically feasible solution to Issue Four. Consequently, a 
special House-Senate Conference Committee was established to develop a compromise solu- 
tion and resolve the political conflict. Issue Five is the basic problem with the added participa- 
tion of the House-Senate Conference Committee and a proposed compromise solution to the 
problem. The proposed compromise was to allow the Water Resources Commission to rank 
order the projects to be funded on a priority basis. The State Legislature would be given the 
option of approving or disapproving this proposed list. The State Legislature would not have 
the power to change the priority ranking of a particular project, but the State Legislature 
would have the option of not funding a particular project. However, if the Legislature chose 
not to fund a specific project on the list as prepared by the Water Resources Commission, all 
projects of a lower priority would also not be funded. This compromise gave the Legislature 
the authority to draw the line on funding as well as approval or disapproval of the entire list. 
Because the Legislature had not been able to agree upon this issue previously, the whole 
program had been delayed. Consequently, the compromise solution received significant 
political support in the actual situation. The compromise solution was adopted and placed 
into the enabling legislation. The simulation model tested the political feasibility of the 
compromise solution. The simulated outcomes concur with the actual results. The model 
predicted a 94/6 split in favor of the compromise solution. The political acceptability of the 
compromise solution resulted from two basic contributing factors. First, it provided a check 
by the Legislature upon the technical analysis performed by the Water Resources Commission. 
If a particular municipality believed that its application for state funds had not received an 
appropriate priority ranking, the municipality would have recourse through the legislature to 
block approval of the priority rankings-provided that the validity of the complaint was 
recognized and supported within the legislature. Secondly, the funding program for water 
pollution control had been delayed while the legislature resolved this issue. Consequently 
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pressure existed to overcome the stalemate and produce the workable compromise solution. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The major objective of this research effort was to validate an existing computer simulation 
model by comparing the results of observed situations to those outcomes simulated by the 
model. The data presented in this paper indicate that the computer model predicted the 
outcomes of the issues tested in a realistic manner. However it is important to emphasize and 
reiterate that this type of simulation model cannot be considered to be completely determinis- 
tic. Rather, it can be now considered as a potentially useful tool in the examination of 
political consequences associated with large-scale water resource projects. Additional testing 
of the model against both historical cases and more importantly with ongoing political conflict 
issues is necessary. 
In addition to the actual validation conclusion, there are a number of related observations 
which follow from the research effort. First, the presence of the political model necessitated a 
systematic approach to the collection of data. This requirement by the model insured that the 
data was organized in a manageable form and that the issues were investigated in a systematic 
fashion. By requiring the researchers to quantify elements of influence, relationships, and 
political power, it  was necessary to perform a detailed and careful analysis of the interacting 
decision units. Secondly, it is recognized that certain of the simulated processes as currently 
performed within the computer model are much too simplified. Further refinement and 
evaluation of the existing model elements is both necessary and desirable. The model in its 
present form does provide a tangible set of model elements which can be evaluated and 
criticized. Third, while only one example was included in this paper, the model demonstrated 
in numerous additional cases as well logical responsiveness to changes in the input data. 
Variations of input data related to position, power, and proposed solution produced reason- 
able changes in the model output. Fourth, the research effort identified the necessity to limit 
the predictions to the specific issues under investigation. It was found to be impossible to 
generalize regarding the orientation of any decision unit over a range of several issues. Fifth, in 
its present form the model does not include time as an explicit parameter. Consequently, it is 
a static analysis with time futed as opposed to a dynamic simulation. The researchers believe 
that the utilization of the model to investigate the development of a specific issue over time 
(issue Three, Four, and Five in this paper) will provide extremely useful information to guide 
the development of a dynamic model from its present static capability. 
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